![tor network directory tor network directory](https://miro.medium.com/max/2000/1*O2G4s3Hq6c9akHkduLvZbg.png)
Tor network directory software#
In autumn 2019 I stumbled on something odd: Tor relays doing something that the official tor software is unable to do. Occasionally I sent some suspicious relay groups to the public tor-talk mailing list instead - which ironically was more fruitful. Starting with June 2019, after multiple reports about suspicious relays remained with no reaction I stopped sending them to the list.
Tor network directory code#
(Tor directory authorities are required to enforce any Tor network wide rules unless it is part of the tor code itself.) (I’m not mentioning his name since he does not want to be publicly associated with bad-relays handling for safety reasons.) Unfortunately also this attempt failed since no Tor directory authority operator answered. In April 2018 a Tor core member - the most active Tor Project person on that closed mailing list - made an attempt to initiate a “do not do” relay requirements list to improve and streamline the handling of malicious Tor relay reports. Even though I’m on that list since then, the decision process to get relays actually removed happens elsewhere (dir-auth) and remains opaque to me. Soon after joining that list I suggested some improvements but things didn’t change since then. In 2017 I was asked to join a closed Tor Project mailing list to help confirming reports of malicious Tor relays - a list where I previously submitted suspicious relays to. In 2015 I started OrNetRadar to help detect new relay groups and possible Sybil attacks that could pose a risk to Tor users. I’ve a long standing interest in the state of the Tor network. The Growing Problem of Malicious Relays on the Tor Network Background